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We look at the decision of the government or "central planner" in the allocation of scarce governmental
resources for tertiary education, as well as that for the individual. We provide estimates of the net present
values, or cost and benefits. These include costs of tertiary education; the benefits of improved skills
of those who remain in the country; and also takes into account the flows of the skilled out of the country
(the brain drain) as well as the remittances they bring into the country. Our results are positive for
the net benefits relative to costs. Our results suggest that (i) there may be room for creative thinking
about the possibility that the brain drain could provide mechanisms for dramatic increases in education
levels within African nations; and (ii) by at least one metric, spending by African nations on higher
education in this period yielded positive returns on the investment. Our results on the individual decision
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Over the past several decades, African nations have been spending large amounts
of their limited government revenues on education, particularly higher education.
Many African leaders and many in the press in many African countries often express
the view that higher education is critical for African economic development. There
are those, however, who criticize spending on higher education because of statistics
showing that a high percentage of those who are educated leave the country (the
Brain Drain) - they point to statistics showing that for some countries around 50%
of the tertiary educated leave, and that many of those who leave were educated at
government expense.
T h eq u e s t i o nw ep o s ei sf a i r l ys i m p l e . C o u l di tb et h a tt h eh u g ei n v e s t m e n t s
in education, particularly at the tertiary level, were actually the right thing to do
during the period we study - roughly the period from post independence to around
the mid-2000’s? Speciﬁcally, could it be that spending on higher education, knowing
full well the extent of the Brain Drain, could have been the right thing to do for
many Sub-Saharan African nations, at least in terms of yielding positive and high
net returns on investment.
We show that taking into account remittances of brain drainers provides a metric
under which the large expenses in tertiary education have been a success via the
metric we use. As we will discuss in our concluding remarks, imaginative thinking
about these computations could therefore in principle result in ways of increasing the
3exceptionally low tertiary enrollment rates in many African countries.
The paper begins by setting out a simple model of the role of education in im-
proving incomes of individuals. We focus on tertiary education, as this is the most
pertinent for the brain drain from Africa for many countries. It is the loss of the
skilled that attracts the greatest amount of attention in the media and in policy de-
bates. At the heart of the exercise is a Net Present Value computation, similar to
that used in the economics of education literature. In particular, we will study
the question of the spending by governments on higher education, focusing on sub-
Saharan Africa. The principal pecuniary costs and beneﬁts of spending on higher
education are collected. These include costs of the education itself and the beneﬁts
of the education among those who stay in the local economy. The analysis explicitly
takes into account the fact that many leave - i.e., there is a brain drain. Further,
and in particular, those who are outside the country also bring in remittances. In
addition, many of those who leave return with higher skill levels.
We discuss the costs and beneﬁts of the brain drain from diﬀerent perspectives.
We begin by discussing this in the context of a nation or a "village." Under this
perspective we think of the village as paying for the tuition but also receiving the
beneﬁts of the increased remittances.
There is also another perspective which is often forgotten in the analysis. That
is the perspective of the individual himself or herself. People migrate to seek better
lives. If successful, then this should be included in the calculus of the pluses and
4minuses of the brain drain. Under this perspective we again see that there are
positive net beneﬁts to the brain drain. Indeed, this resolves a paradox in the
literature on the economics of education that has found very low internal rates of
return to tertiary education in many African countries. This is a paradox because
it is contrary to what would initially be expected in countries with very low human
capital levels seeking rapid economic transformation. In our computations, allowing
for the probability of draining and therefore earning large incomes abroad, we obtain
r e l a t i v e l yl a r g er a t e so fr e t u r n . T h i ss u g g e s t st h a ti ti st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fb e i n ga
part of the brain drain which results in evident high interest of many to invest their
time in tertiary education.
This paper provides the detailed data analyses and empirical implementations
of ideas in Easterly and Nyarko (2009) and earlier. As will be described later,
some computations have been made in Boller et. al. (2010) which are related but
diﬀerent from those of the current paper, using survey data for Ghana. We are not
aware of any other papers which explicitly model the costs and beneﬁts of spending
on education taking into account the brain drain in Africa. As we shall point out
in each of the subsections, there has been a voluminous amount of research work
done on the various elements that go into our computations - remittances, brain
drain migration statistics, the value of diaspora both when they are abroad (trading
networks) and when they return. Clemens et. al. (2008) and Clemens (2007) have
also documented positive aspects of the Brain Drain.
52 The Simplest Village Economy
To ﬁx ideas, we now describe a stylized small African village. We imagine the local
leaders or the village chief or voters deciding on how much to spend on tertiary
education at the university in their village which has recently been created. We
imagine a village economy with small numbers of educated beyond the primary level,
modest secondary schooling and with an extremely limited tertiary educated stock.
The economy also has extremely limited industrial capacity or a tertiary sector.
The decision makers need to decide how much to spend on higher education.
Those who have ﬁnished secondary school level may be able to enter the university
system. Since there are so few spots at the tertiary or university level relative to the
possible entrants with secondary schooling, the numbers that enter the university level
is constrained only by the village government spending. Hence, the total number
of seats at the university level is determined by the total spending of the village
governments on tertiary education. In particular, at this stage we ignore private
schools and tuition paid at government tertiary institutions, each being negligible for
many sub-Saharan nations for the period of interest. We will let c denote the cost
per year for educating an individual. It takes TC years to complete the university
education; typically, TC =4 but can run from 3 to 5 years. It is presumed that the
costs are raised from general taxes of the villagers. (Our robustness section will deal
further with this assumption and myriad other issues.)
Of the tertiary educated a fraction will be drained oﬀ to foreign villages or coun-
6tries, with the residual fraction remaining in the home village. Those who remain in
the local economy earn wages and contribute to the economy. Those who are abroad
are assumed to send back home remittances to family members each year they are
abroad.
The villagers obtain "utility" from having educated people locally around them.
In particular, their valuation of educated people is precisely equal to the wage rate








expected wages of individuals of education level i in the local economy. We shall
use i=0,1,2,3, to denote the education levels of categories "uneducated", "primary",
"secondary" and "tertiary", so that the two designations that will be important here
will be i=2 (secondary) and i=3 (tertiary). As our emphasis is on the tertiary
e d u c a t e d ,w es h a l ls u p p o s et h a ti ti so nly the tertiary educated who drain.
The village chiefs also value the remittances of those who leave the village. These
remittances are of the form of transfers to other members of village, construction of
houses in the village, etc. Let {Rt}
∞
t=0 denote the sequence of expected remittances
of an individual, which only happen when outside of the village; in particular we may
think of Rt =0when the individual is within the economy. In particular, the village
chiefs do not assign a value to the wages received in foreign countries by those who
leave for those foreign countries - they care only about their remittances.
The village chiefs do not care who gets the remittances just as they do not care
who gets to talk to or be serviced by the educated within the local village economy.
7In particular distributional issues do not worry them.
Incomes (and costs) in the future are discounted by a discount factor. Let r0
























The village elders seek to maximize the expected discounted present value of the
streams of incomes, W + R of the diﬀerent types of agents less costs of educating
them at the tertiary level, C.
At the optimum, the village chiefs will compare the costs of educating the marginal
student, from secondary level to tertiary level, to the expected discounted beneﬁt
accrued from that marginal student.
In this village, drainage occurs right after schooling. There is a probability d
that our representative individual will leave the village. If the individual does not
leave but instead stays in the village, the individual will stay in the village forever.
If the individual leaves (or "drains"), there is a probability χ that the individual will
return to the village economy, and a probability 1-χ that the individual never returns.
8As mentioned earlier, the chiefs of the village receive satisfaction from knowing that
their young ones are either employed locally at high wages or are sending remittances
to other members of the village.
The village chiefs think of there being two possibilities or types of the tertiary
educated representative individual. With probability (1 − d) the individual will not
drain and will stay in the local economy. We refer to these types as the locally
resident educated (or "LRE"). The net additional return of the chiefs from such





Next, with probability d the individual will drain. Conditional on draining,
there is a probability of (1 − χ) that the individual will drain and never return to
work in the village. The chiefs get no wage satisfaction in that state in any period,
but will be receive satisfaction from the remittances in that state. If we let RNR
denote the net present value of the expected remittances in this state, then the net
satisfaction of the chiefs, NPVNR, equals the expectation of these remittances less






Finally, conditional on draining, with probability χ the individual will leave the









denote the expected net present value of this sequence of wages in the local econ-
omy, with an analogous deﬁnition for Rret,the remittances they send when they are
o u t s i d eo ft h ec o u n t r ya n dw h i c hw es e tt oz e r oi na n yp e r i o dtw h e nt h e ya r ew i t h i n







Hence, the expected return of the "Drainers" to the chiefs, including both those
who never return as well as those who return, will be
NPV
D =( 1− χ)NPV
NR+ χNPV
ret.
T h er e t u r nt ot h ec h i e f s ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h en e tc o n t r i b u t i o no ft h et w ot y p e s
of tertiary educated, those who are local and those who drain, is therefore:
NPV =( 1− d)NPV
LRE+dNPV
D. (1)
To see this even more clearly, write the expected utility of the educated in (1)
above as follows. First, recall we deﬁned Wret to be the expected discounted wages of





10is the expected sum of discounted wages that were not received because the individ-
ual was abroad. These are the wages that could have been received if the individual
was in the home country as opposed to being abroad. A simple re-arrangement of
(1) shows that



















In particular, the NPV can be broken into two parts. The ﬁrst part, NPVvillage,
is the expected net present value of the increment if there was absolutely no brain
drain, and the second, ∆NPVabroad, representing the expected discounted increment
of the remittances over local village wages in each of the periods that the individual
is abroad. The ﬁrst term, NPVvillage , is the NPV which would obtain if there
was absolutely no brain drain. We expect this to be positive, although the internal
rates of return obtained both here and in the literature are low. The expression
∆NPVabroad represents the impact of the brain drain. To the extent that remittances
exceed incomes locally, this expression will be positive. In the exposition below we
shall frequently talk about the returns to education without the brain drain and mean
11the expression NPVvillage; and refer to the incremental eﬀect of the brain drain as
the term ∆NPVabroad.
3 Results for the Village Economy
In the subsequent sections we will be discussing our simple model in great detail, and
we will further discuss our data in some detail. In our robustness section we will stress
test our model with diﬀerent parameter value assumptions. In this section we quickly
state our main conclusions under some stylized parameter values for Ghana. We
will follow some standard procedures in the literature on the economics of education
and compute some internal rates of return.
We will proceed by providing a quick list of some of the data and parameter values
we use.
(i) We use the cost data for tertiary education from the UN datasets.
(ii) We obtain data on the brain drain probabilities, d,f r o mt h eD o q u i e ra n d
Marfouk et. al. (2005) data sets.
(iii) We obtain the value of χ from survey data which suggests a value χ =0 .5
as the probability of return and with this taking place at year 7 being reasonable
assumptions to use.
(iv) We use the Ghana Livings Survey data (GLSS V) to get the wages1, W(3) and
W(2).
1See See http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docﬁles/glss5_report.pdf
12(v) We use data on remittances given by the UN International Fund for Agri-
cultural Development (IFAD) surveys, which imply a per migrant remittance value
of US $5,260 for Ghana, as well as the lower value of $3600 per person per year.
The ﬁrst pass of our results can be summarized in Table 1 below. We report
both the internal rate of return2 (IRR) as well as the net present value at an interest
rate of 5%. We do this for each of the diﬀerent types of tertiary educated types
mentioned earlier: Locally Resident ("LRE" above), Never Returns (NR above),
Returnees (’ret." above), the drainers ("D" above) and the tertiary educated as a
class ("E" above).
Table 1: Internal Rates of Return and Net Present Values.
We obtain positive and large internal rates of return and net present values. Using
the IFAD remittances data we obtain for the tertiary educated as a whole, an internal
2The internal rate of return is deﬁned as the interest rate at which the Net Present Value is equal
to zero. This is often used as a measure of the proﬁtability of an activity or enterprise yielding
costs and incomes over time. Although it has many faults, its use is standard in the Economics of
Education literture.
13rate of return of 29% and a net present value at r=5% of $32,361. The values are
lower but still large when we use the lower value of $3600.
What is driving the results should be clear: the remittances of those who leave
compensate for the loss from being at home locally. In our robustness section we
stress test our model with even lower values of the remittances than the two illustrated
above.
4 Do W and R capture true costs and beneﬁts?
One big question in this entire analysis is whether the wages and the remittances
truly capture the beneﬁts of tertiary education and the value (or losses) associated
with those who drain. What are the arguments for and against using W and R as
measures of the value of the tertiary educated?
We begin by noting that we have included the costs of tertiary education in our
computations, noting in our robustness section the obvious issues surrounding its use
and how sensitive our conclusions are possible errors in the estimates. So here we
take out costs in our discussion.
So, our ﬁrst and somewhat feeble defense in the use of wages as the value of
the tertiary educated is that it is what is used in most of the returns to education
literature. The question we seek to ask is not the moral or philosophical one of what
is the value of a human being. Instead it is the narrow economic question of whether
14resources used in educating an individual from secondary to tertiary education is
worth the resources used for that tertiary education. The question then becomes
one of evaluating the beneﬁts of that additional education against its costs. At a
ﬁrst pass, the additional wages that tertiary educated person will earn is a proxy
for that additional beneﬁt from the schooling. For the village elders in the village
economy who are expending resources the additional resources of their village sons and
daughters and the remittances they bring back to the parents in the village will feature
heavily in their calculus of the pluses and minuses of the spending. Remittances often
end up with members of the village, often the poorest members. This is a plus to the
village elders. In our individual calculations, one would presume that wages would
b eah u g ep a r to fo n ep a r t i c u l a rp e r s o n ’ sc o s ta n db e n e ﬁt analyses of education. Yes,
there may be other motivating factors like quality of life, prestige, etc. But these are
often correlated with wages, and, raw cash itself has to be important too.
Let us pursue this question further though. What are other measures that should
be used? How else could we objectively measure the value of the tertiary education?
Or, to say this in a diﬀerent way, what are the other possible aspects of the tertiary
educated which could be contributory factors in assessing the pluses and minuses.
Well, there are a number of possible ways. There are valid factors to include in
our analysis, but it is not be clear whether these factors help our hurt our general
conclusions. In particular, the relative importance of tertiary education and also the
brain drain could actually be increased by adding these other factors. We leave these
15questions for later sections (and later papers). We will however mention one of them
now.
One issue that comes us continually in the discussion of the brain drain is the issue
of having enough critical mass in the home countries. There argument is usually made
that if more of the talented Ghanaians, say, would stay in Ghana, they would exert
pressure locally to result in change at home. There are of course many responses
to this argument. First, there is quite a large amount of unemployment among
the tertiary educated. It is not at all clear that being in their home countries and
dependent on the government for jobs, the tertiary educated would form the eﬀective
pressure group often dreamed about in the media. Indeed, having a large diaspora
community exerting a fearless independent voice may be much better. Those who
have been part of the brain drain and have returned to their home country may
have outside options and hence be less afraid of criticizing the local leaders. These
are potential pluses of the brain drain, and, when appropriately measured could
strengthen our basic argument.
5 The Individual Decision Problem
A b o v ew eh a v et r e a t e dt h ec o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts from the point of view of the village
collectively. The villagers tax themselves to pay for the education of their children,
and perceive rewards according to the local wages the children receive when they are
locally resident, or the remittances they bring when they are abroad.
16We can now think of the individual or family perspective. As a ﬁrst pass at
the individual perspective, we can simply follow the existing literature on internal
r a t e so fr e t u r na sf o l l o w s . I nt h i sﬁrst pass, suppose the tertiary educated beneﬁts
are, as before, the incremental wages over and above secondary educated, and that
those tertiary educated wages equal either the local wages if the individual is locally
resident or foreign wages when the person is abroad. In particular, notice that this is
exactly the same as the exposition for the village economy but where the remittances
are replaced by foreign wages.
Let us continue by assuming that the costs are precisely the costs of education as
above which is described in detail, as will be the described the data on foreign wages.
We are computing the social returns to tertiary education so we use the same costs
as in the village economy. By replacing remittances by foreign wages we are getting
to the individual decision problem and individual costs and beneﬁts. This provides
a useful comparison with the existing literature: what happens to the rates of return
when we add the beneﬁts of the Brain Drain - we know that for some countries 50%
or more of the tertiary educated are outside their home countries so omitting the
brain drain is potentially omitting an important factor in the returns to education
calculus.
T h er e t u r n sw ec o m p u t ew o u l db eg e n u i n ep r i v a t er e t u r n si fi n d i v i d u a l sp a yf o r
their education, which they do not in practice. However, we perform our computa-
t i o n sa si ft h e yd i d ,a n dw ei n c l u d ea sc o s t st h ec o s t so ft h ee d u c a t i o n .
17So, what do the Net present values (NPV’s) and the internal rates of return (IRR)
look like? Well, to continue with our computations we require the wages of the typical
tertiary trained individual when abroad. We have data on incomes of Ghanaians in
the US from the US census data. We also have data on Africans in Europe from
various OECD databases. These are all described in detail later.
In terms of our computations, note that all we have to do is to replace the
ﬁgure for remittances in the village economy computations with that of wages for the
individual computations. The village chiefs have an optimization problem similar to
the individual private returns computation except that when the tertiary educated
migrate, the chiefs value them for their remittances while the individual values himself
or herself via the foreign wages. Clearly, since we obtained positive Net Present
Values (NPV) and Internal rates of return (IRR) with the lower remittances values, we
expect much higher NPV’s and IRR when we perform the individual computations.
We will perform our computations under two scenarios. The ﬁrst is with the
parameters we used in the baseline case. The second multiplies the local Ghanaian
wages of the tertiary educated and the local costs of tertiary education by a factor of 2.
We intend for this to capture any possible miscalculations in those variables. Further,
since we are here comparing wages earned while resident abroad to wages earned while
resident locally, there is an argument for scaling the wages of the tertiary educated up
to account for purchasing power parity (PPP) as is standard in, for example, Gross
National Income computations. 3 We seek to correct for biases which may cause
3We can obtain the Purchasing Power Parity factor from the World Bank World Development
18us to underestimate wages and costs of the tertiary educated. In particular, we
are not also increasing the base wages of the secondary educated. All types of the
tertiary educated, which we focus on here, use the secondary educated as the base
in computing net present values so changes to the secondary wages would aﬀect each
group equivalently.
For the Ghana data, our results can be summarized in Table 2 below, where we
have listed the internal rates of return (IRR) as well as the Net Present Values at an
interest rate of r=5% (NPV5). We see that both are high for the individual, both
under the standard parameters (multiplier=1 in the table) as well as when we double
both the local wages and local costs (multiplier=2 in the table). For the tertiary
educated as a whole, the internal rate of return is 67% for the standard parameters
and 49% when we double the wage and cost parameters. Each of these numbers is
very high relative to what is normally presented in the literature. The net present
values NPV5 are $126,244 and $149,522 respectively.
Indices (WDI) by looking at the Gross National Income and dividing the value in PPP terms by
that in current US $. For a variety of reasons, the PPP factor moves quite a bit from year to
year. From the World Bank WDI datasets at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator as of Jan 12,
2011, for the years 2005,2006,...,2009 the GNI those years in current US $bn was [10.0, 13.3, 18.4
26.8 28.4]; while in PPP international US $bn was [25.8, 28.5, 31.4, 34.7 and 36.6] resulting in what
we call PPP ratios of [ 2.5, 2.1, 1.7 1.2 1.3]. Ratios for prior years also exhibits similar variability
around the value of 2.
19Table 2.
W h e nw ed o u b l et h ec o s t sa n dw a g e st h e r ei sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eI R Ra n dt h eN P V 5
for the locally resident - the IRR goes from 14% to 18% while the NPV5 goes from
$17,229 to $51,192. In this case the beneﬁts to lifetime increases in wages outweigh
the eﬀect of the increase in costs (relative to the wages of secondary educated4).
There is a decrease in the values for those who never return, as they are aﬀected by
the increase in costs of education but do not get any of the beneﬁts of the increase
in wages - the IRR goes from 90% to 68% while the NPV5 goes from $342,188 to
$338,409.
We stress here that what we are computing are actually "social" rates of return, as
we have included the costs of education in the computation of the pluses and minuses.
If we excluded the costs of education we would obtain even higher values of the IRR
and NPV5. Given the large percentage who travel abroad, and the higher wages
4We remind the reader that we are not also doubling the wages of the secondary school educated
- if we did then there would be no change in the IRR and NPV5 of the locally educated as all
relevant variables would then have been doubled.
20abroad relative to within the local economy, the higher returns of the drainers pushes
up dramatically the ex ante expected returns to tertiary education as a whole - i.e.,
among the collective group of tertiary educated drainers and non-drainers.
We obtain ﬁgures far higher than those in the literature. See for example the
survey paper Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). The ﬁgures in the literature for
rates of return to tertiary education in Sub-Saharan Africa are of the magnitude of
what we obtain for in our tables above for the locally resident tertiary educated,
as they should be. They are the same measures, except that diﬀerent authors use
diﬀerent datasets and slightly diﬀerent methods of estimation. We believe that since
there is such a high incidence of brain drain in the countries we are interested in, it is
important to include the brain drain in the compuations of the returns to education.
When we do include these measures, we obtain extremely high rates of return.
This may resolve a certain paradox. Despite the low returns obtained in the
literature, many Africans continually clamor for governments to invest in higher edu-
cation. The media and popular presses all insist on the importance of investments in
tertiary education. Students also clamor for the limited slots in the tertiary institu-
tions. This would be paradoxical given the literature’s stated low rates of return to
higher education. A possible resolution to the paradox involves people taking into
consideration the fact that they may get a change to drain abroad to obtain higher
salaries. Our ﬁgures show that when these are taken into account, the rate of return
to tertiary education as a whole become relatively large numbers.
21We now turn to a detailed description of the data in the next few sections. Follow-
ing that we will deal with some robustness issues - stress testing our model conclusions
with diﬀerent parameter values.
6C o s t o f T e r t i a r y E d u c a t i o n , C .
The cost to the government per year of the typical tertiary educated person is
obtained from the UNESCO datasets. The data on annual costs is often presented
in a form which is after normalizing by (or dividing by) that year’s nominal GDP per
capita. This enables some comparability across nations, albeit imperfect. For all
African nations for which we have data, the per student annual tertiary costs have
been decreasing over time. For Ghana the costs have gone from 14.8 in 1970 to 2.09
in 2005. Given the recent extremely rapid increases in student numbers in Ghana,
our expectation is that per unit costs today for Ghana have dropped signiﬁcantly
below this number. In Burkina Faso, it has gone from a large 29.39 in 1980 to 1.93
in 2005.
COUNTRY EARLY COST  YEAR LATER COST YEAR
Botswana 6.98 1975 3.72 1985
Burkina Faso 29.39 1980 1.93 2005
Ethiopia 9.51 1995 5.74 1993
Ghana 14.82 1970 2.09 2005
Mauritius 3.56 1980 0.30 2006
Rwanda 14.46 1970 4.04 2005
Senegal 4.32 1980 2.35 2005
Zambia 13.27 1970 1.68 2000
22TABLE 3: PER UNIT ANNUAL COSTS OF TERTIARY EDUCATION
For example, for Ghana the cost today is about 2 times GDP per capita. For
the countries for which there is reasonably current data, the per unit annual costs
hover around this number or less. The questions about the costs and how they move
over time will be important in our robustness section. For this reason we re-produce
below the most current data we have for African nations as well as the year of the
data, ordered from the smallest to the highest costs.
COUNTRIES COST YEARS
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.24 1999
Mauritius 0.30 2006
Mauritania 0.41 2005

















Burkina Faso 1.93 2005
Ivory Coast 1.94 1994
Kenya 2.05 2000
Ghana 2.09 2005


















23Table 4: Most current Cost data.
6.1 Cost Recovery via Loans, Tuition, etc.
There are a number of issues which may distort the calculations above and give us
potentially an incorrect view of the costs of the provision of tertiary education. On
t h eo n eh a n dt h e r ea r ev a r i o u sc o s tr e c o v e r ya n dt u i t i o np o l i c i e sb yu n i v e r s i t i e s . T o
the extent that there is cost-recovery, this would imply an overestimation of costs and
an underestimation of the beneﬁts of education in our own computations in the village
economy above. We list these below,but argue that they are very small and would not
appreciably change our main conclusions. Further, it is unclear whether the costs of
education above eﬀectively take into account (a) the school capital construction costs
and (b) the possibly distortionary eﬀects of the method in which the government
raises money to pay for the costs of higher education. We will revisit these issues in
our robustness section, but ﬁrst we list some of the possible cost-recovery schemes.
Again, we will argue that under plausible assumptions our main assumptions still
hold.
Before we provide the list of these schemes, it may be important to discuss in the
context of our model whether and how cost recovery should be treated in the basic
optimization problem. There are two ways of viewing the interpretation of costs
and indeed the entire optimization exercise in enter our village economy above. One
interpretation is that the village elders think of "taxing" themselves to pay for the
24costs of the tertiary education for which they receive as beneﬁts both remittances and
the beneﬁt of the services of the educated youth, and that those services are measured
by the wages the educated receive. For example the value of the services of a doctor
is higher than the services of a clerical worker, the value of each measured by their
respective wages. Under this interpretation of cost recovery is a net beneﬁtt ot h e
village chiefs; they receive the same services at lower net cost. (In this hypothetical
exercise we suppose remittances would not be aﬀected by cost recovery.)
However, there is another interpretation of the village economy. Suppose that
the chiefs have primarily altruistic motivations and caring mostly about the youth,
and in particular the net wages the youth receive upon graduation (as well as the
remittances). If the students have to pay back to the chiefs a part of the cost,
then this should be equivalent to a negative wage for the youth while going to school,
and therefore a negative in the altruistic chiefs net present value computation. In
particular, for these altruistic chiefs the cost recovery reduces chiefs costs and also
reduces one for one their perceived beneﬁts. Cost recovery therefore would not
aﬀect the net present value computation of these altruistic chiefs.5 As mentioned
earlier, cost recovery is very small for many sub-Saharan African nations so the above
mentioned arguments are somewhat moot.
We now list some possible cost recovery mechanisms practiced.
5I thank David Weil for bringing this point up.
25Tuition and Private Universities If universities charge students tuition, then
the government costs are much lower than those computed above. Indeed, one could
imagine situations where the government cost of providing education is zero. Indeed,
in some private for-proﬁt universities the tuition may even exceed costs, so that there
is a surplus for the investors or shareholders of the private university. During the
period we have most of our data - up to 2000, the numbers of private universities
in Ghana and many other African countries has been small. It is only in the past
decade and less that private universities have taken oﬀ.
Student Loans As with student payment of tuition and enrollment in private
universities, student loans could be used as a form of cost-recovery. This however
is not widely used in Africa and even in situations where it is used, it is not clear
how much of costs are really recovered (given the low or negative real interest rates,
administrative costs and loan defaults). (See Douglas and Ziderman (1993)).
National Service An alternate form of cost recovery is national service. This
scheme requires those in universities to work before during or after their schooling.
The salary is often lower than government civil service salaries so in principle this
could be a form of cost recovery. As noted by Albrecht and Ziderman (1995) however,
t h ec o s tr e c o v e r yb e n e ﬁts of national service are very low. Further, in areas where
there is an excess supply of the tertiary educated and therefore unemployment in
26those ranks, the national service could be considered a beneﬁt to the student and
potentially a cost to the government as the jobs are eﬀectively being guaranteed.
Partnerships with industry Partnerships with industry are often touted as being
possible ways of generating income for universities. At this time, however, even for
Europe the estimates of the contribution to total costs of universities is low (6.5%
was the estimate for Germany by Albrecht and Ziderman (1995)), and given their
lower industrial bases his would be expected to have almost negligible contribution
to costs for African countries.
7 Young Locally Educated who Stay
Estimates of incremental wages of those with tertiary education will be obtained from
living standards surveys. As described earlier, the time series of wages of secondary
educated, tertiary educated and returnees are all needed in making our net expected
returns computations. We have explicit data from the Ghanaian data sets, which
we proceed to describe.
7.1 The GLSS Data Sets
We describe the Ghanaian data set below. The Ghana Living Surveys were taken
at three diﬀerent years: versions 3, 4 and 5 taken respectively in years 1991, 1998,
27and 2005. The surveys asked respondents a series of questions including education
levels, age, and wages, among very many others. In the computations presented
here we focus on the GLSS 5 datasets, the most recent. GLSS5 was conducted in
2005/2006, covered the entire country with a sample size of 8,687 households. In the
Figure 1 below we summarize the number of data points - broken down by education
level and age level. We will of course be most concerned about the secondary and
tertiary education levels in our computations.
Figure 1. Number of Data Points in GLSS Survey Data.
Next, for our computations we need to compute the wage rate for each edu-
cation level at each age. The ﬁrst and direct method is of course to take the average








used earlier and are shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. Earnings of each educational group as a function of age.
We note here that the average wages of the tertiary educated in Figure 2 may
seem low to the casual observer. We did some back of the envelope checks of this
data. After university education Ghanaians are required to do national service,
considered by some as guaranteed employment for such students, many who may
otherwise be unemployed. Those wages were in the relevant years around $600
per year. In contrast , public service workers were around $300-$500 per year,
with higher amounts in the private sector. There was also anecdotal evidence of a
decent amount of unemployment among the tertiary educated. These facts seem to
29corroborate the data from the GLSS survey for the tertiary educated6.
One other issue we have to address is whether to include or exclude the wages
of those coded in the data as having income of 0. Most, although probably not
all, of these are presumably unemployed. In our computations we average wages
including those of all the zeros (although we exclude all those with income "N/A"
or not available). In Table 5 below, we note the ratios of incomes including and
excluding the 0 incomes. We do this for the three diﬀerent waves of the GLSS
data sets. We compute for each the income ratio between tertiary and secondary
educated (as these are the cohorts of interest to us). In particular, columns 2 and
3 of Table 5 provide the ratio ¯ w3/¯ w2 of the average wage of the tertiary educated,
¯ w3, and the secondary educated, ¯ w2, with and without the zero income earners.
The second column above shows the ratio of the average of the tertiary educated to
the average of the secondary educated in the GLSS samples, including those with
zero income. These range between 2.30 and 2.66 indicating a slight increase in the
ratio over the diﬀerent waves - the tertiary educated are out-earning the secondary
educated by larger fractions over time. The third column shows the ratio of average
wages when we exclude those with zero incomes (presumably due to unemployment).
We see then that there is a small decrease in ratio from wave 3 to 4, then an increase
6 GLSS 5 Report (September 2008) summarizes the ﬁndings of the GLSS 5 survey. Section 9.8
covers household income. Table 9.18 shows mean annual per capita income for all Ghana at GHC397
or about US$433 in prevailing exchange rates. The stated mean annual per capita income for the
highest quintile is GHC688 (or about US$750).
30from 4 to 5. We look at respondents who are of age 18 and above in computing our
a v e r a g ew a g e s . C o l u m n s4a n d5r e p o r tt h er a t i o so ft h el o g so fa v e r a g ei n c o m e s ,
log(¯ w3)/log(¯ w2). Given our purposes and the results presented here, we therefore

























3 2.30 2.29 1.07 1.06 0.69
4 2.33 2.18 1.06 1.05 0.81
5 2.66 2.37 1.06 1.05 0.82
Table 5: Income Ratios (tertiary over secondary) and Mincer Regression
Coeﬃcients.
7.2 Smoothing Data via the Mincer Regressions
As an alternate to using the raw average wages, one could consider smoothing the
wages using the Mincer regressions, as is popular in the economics of education lit-
erature. In particular, let w denote income, let AGE be the age of the individual,
and let SCHOOL be the dummy which is equal to 1 if tertiary educated, and zero
otherwise. As is common in this literature, we use age as a proxy for experience.
The Mincer regression we run is then given by
31lnw = α + β0.AGE + β1.AGE
2 + γ.SCHOOL+ ε.
The Mincer regression we report is, γ, the coeﬃcient on the tertiary schooling
dummy variable. Some standard theory, or the interpretations of the theory, in
the Economics of Education literature considers the parameter γ to be the returns to
schooling and the internal rate of return of that schooling (the interest rate at which
the net present value of the incremental return to schooling is zero).
We can apply the Mincer regressions to get an estimate of the wage rate as a
function of age or experience. We then assume that an individual currently beginning
the schooling process will follow that trajectory of wage rates into the future. We
then set the wage of an individual of age t and education level i to be equal to the
value predicted by the Mincer Regression, at those given values of t and i. Figure
3 shows the Mincer equation smoothing of the raw income data.
32Figure 3. Mincer Regression smoothing of incomes.
First, we note that we obtain very little diﬀerence in our results upon using
the method with raw averages versus those with the Mincer regressions. We have
therefore chosen to report the former. We also note in passing that the issues of
inclusion or exclusion of the unemployed arises, just as with the raw non-smoothed
averages. Again, since it does not seriously aﬀect our results, we report only the
33values with the zero incomes included.
Our results are of course are consistent with standard results in the Economics of
Education literature, when remittances and the Brain Drain are excluded. Without
the latter, the returns to tertiary education in Africa are surprisingly low, as well
documented in the literature. Bloom Canning and Chan (2005) and references cited
there are a good source for a review of the literature.
7.3 Panels and Pseudo-Panels
Note that we have used a ﬁxed year (2005) cross-section of individuals and used this
as a proxy for the evolution of incomes across time. This use of a ﬁxed time data
set to measure life cycle earnings, although common in the economics of education
literature, is still not one would wish for. There are, however, surprisingly few panel
data sets which track individuals over time to enable us to seriously answer this
defect. One option, which we have not chosen here, is to create a pseudo panel to
with some individuals from each of the three waves of the GLSS datasets at diﬀerent
ages to mimic the evolution of individuals across time. In particular, earlier datasets
are used for younger cohorts while later datasets are used for the older cohorts. We
would be piecing together diﬀerent people at diﬀerent times to construct a ﬁctitious
panel. Given the somewhat stark nature of our net present value results, we doubt
that this would have made a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to our conclusions.
Again, we concede there are many issues with the use of the data sets in computing
34t h ew a g ep r o ﬁles. The possible weak arguments in our defense are ﬁr s tt h a ti ti st h e
best data we have and second that it is currently the norm in the literature we seek
to contribute to.
8 The Rate of Drainage, d, and the rate of return
χ
In the description of the village economy above, we made a number of simplifying
assumptions on when there is the ﬁrst exit out of the local economy, the drain, and
when there is return to the local economy of those who do indeed return. In the
more general version of the simple village economy, there is potentially a complicated
stochastic process explaining the emigration and return decisions. In this general
model, what we need to do is to set a sequence of probabilities {dt}t of draining in
each period t. Then, conditional on draining in period T, we need to specify in
addition the probability of return in each subsequent period, {χt}
∞
t=T . Since there
is a chance the representative individual never returns, we let χ∞. represent this
probability. In particular, we need to set probabilities {χt}
∞
t=T and χ∞ such that
χ∞ +
P∞
t=T χt =1 . Further, in the general case, there could also be re-migrations
after the ﬁrst return, and later returns after later migrations.
Instead, we shall impose very severe assumptions in our initial computations. The
motivation for these come from surveys and casual observations. Recall that our
35primary focus is with emigration to OECD countries. Many who leave make one
important emigration decision and then stay abroad for a while. When they decide
to return, it is usually for good. (We are of course excluding short tourist visits).
In the survey by Black, King and Litchﬁeld (2003), they ﬁnd that the overwhelming
majority of respondents who have returned (83%) state that their return is perma-
nent, with only 11% stating that they intend to re-emigrate. We therefore model
our representative agent as making a decision to migrate one time, then after going
abroad, staying there until a one time and irreversible decision to return.
We further calibrate our model as follows. First we suppose that migration takes
place almost immediately after completion of tertiary education. In particular, in our
ﬁrst cut we assume that the drainage occurs right after schooling. In particular, we
suppose that tertiary education ends at age t=22, then using the notation mentioned
above, d22 = d>0 and dt =0 for all other periods t.
We then use as a ﬂow probability d, the average rate of migration of tertiary
educated migrants obtained from obtained from the work of Docquier and Marfouk
(2005). The data are obtained from censuses in OECD countries, and is available
for the year 2000, as well as from national enrollment data. We will use the 2000
rates of migration of skilled or tertiary educated in our computations. If one believes
that emigration has been increasing over time, then these average migration rates
will underestimate the true migration rates. As will be shown later, this would
strengthen our basic conclusions.
36When does our representative agent return? In particular, using the notation
above, what are the return probabilities χ∞ and {χt}
∞
t=T ? Of those who decide to
return, we shall approximate this by assigning all of the probability χ on a return
date at year 7. There are two reasons for this. First, this is suggested by the
survey of Black, King and Litchﬁeld (2003) and Pires et. al. (1999). Second, it is
our hunch that a lot of the tertiary educated go to the OECD for further education
(graduate degrees), which take about 5 or 6 years and then spend a year or two doing
p r a c t i c a lt r a i n i n g( i ft h e ya r eo nF 1v i s a s )o ri ft h e yw a n tt og e taq u i c kj o bt or e a d y
themselves for return.
Again, in our robustness section we shall discuss alternative formulations of the
return probabilities and analyze the impacts on our results, spreading this probability
over several years. It is fairly easy to see the impact of these changes in the date of
return. We mention a few more surveys from the return migration literature in the
subsection below.
8.1 Review of some of the Return Migration Literature
• Gundel and Peters (2008) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOP) to examine return migration among immigrants to Germany. They
ﬁnd that highly-skilled individuals are more likely to leave Germany than low-
skilled migrants. However, return migration is found to be lower for migrants
37from non-EU countries.
• Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport (2007) also
study the return of migrants. The latter refers to work showing that return
rate rose from less than one ﬁfth to about two thirds for the return of Taiwanese
Ph.D.s who graduated from US universities the ﬁelds of Science and Engineering
from the 1970’s to the 1990’s. Very low rates of return are quoted from some
studies of China and India, while some other Indian software industry surveys
"showed strong evidence of brain circulation, with 30-40% the higher-level em-
ployees having relevant work experience in a developed country (Commander
et al., 2004b)."
• The survey by Lowell and Findlay (2002) shows that some 50% of skilled workers
return to their countries of origin , usually after about ﬁve years.
9 The Premium of the Returnees
When those who have been abroad return to their home countries, how much do
they earn? Well, there are several parts to this, only one of which we will be able
to meaningfully capture at this time. First, the returned come back with better
skills. Second, they may earn a premium relative to their skill level because of the
fact that they have had experiences abroad. On the other hand, because of lost
38social networks the returnees may face diminished wages. For our initial cut on the
Net Present Value computations, we shall assume for now no premium on returned
migrants. In later work, and with better data, we will provide estimates of what we
think are the net positives from the returned superior skills of migrants.
9.1 Literature and data on Returnee Premia
As regards data on the premium of the returned we have identiﬁed a number of
surveys which we list below.
1. Gibson and McKenzie (2010) ﬁnd that migrants who return home do not
tend to earn higher incomes than non-migrants. However, they do tend to return with
higher levels of human capital. Levels of repatriated savings appear to be similar in
level to annual remittances, and there is some evidence that return migrants are more
likely to be investing in business start-ups and sharing knowledge than non-migrants.
2. A recent household survey on urban population De Vreyer, P., F. Gubert,
and A-S. Robilliard (2008) studied the impact of return international migration in
seven major cities in Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal
and Togo). The surveys took place from 2001 to 2002. The sample consists of
58,459 individuals aged 15 years and older; 52,267 individuals in the sample never
left the country where they were born and interviewed. The return migrants from
OECD countries are 390 in number, and they constitute 0.6% of the sample. Average
individual earnings of return migrants are 227.1 and non migrants are 55.9 (in 1000
39FCFA PPP; only active individuals). The average years of education of OECD return
migrants is 11.1, compared to 5.6 for the non-migrants.
In Benin and Togo, conditioning on education individuals who have been abroad
earn 28% and 21% more than those who have not, and the eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant. In the other 5 cities the outcomes are mixed (negative in Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Senegal and positive in Burkina Faso and Nigher) but the coeﬃcients are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
3. Wahba (2007) examines the labor market performance of return migrants to
Egypt, and ﬁnds that on average, return migrants earn about 38% more than similar
non-migrants. The wage premium is lower for highly educated migrants: university
graduates earn on average 19% more than their non-migrant counterparts.
4. Barrett and Goggin (2010) estimate the wage premium for Irish migrants
u s i n ga2 0 0 6s u r v e yo fI r i s hﬁrms. After controlling for other factors likely to aﬀect
earnings, they ﬁnd a 7% wage premium associated with return migrants. Estimated
wage premiums diﬀer by education level and migration destination. The premium
for migrants with a postgraduate qualiﬁcation was estimated to be 10%. Moreover,
migrants that moved to far away countries (US, Australia) were found to beneﬁtf r o m
a higher premium than migrants that stayed in the UK or Europe. Finally, they ﬁnd
that the premium diminishes at a rate of about 1% per year.
4010 Remittances
10.1 How big are the Remittances?
African workers send home around US$40 billion by one estimate to the region (see
table below) . The value of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding North) are
small by world standards, but high relative to GDP in Africa. The highest value
of the remittances to GDP ratio is Nigeria, at 10.9 percent, with an additional four
countries at ratios of 9 percent or higher (see Table 6 below, as well as Barajas et.
al. (2010)).
Country Year Remittances/GDP
1 Nigeria 2007 10.9%
2 Sierra Leone 2007 9.7%
3 Togo 207 9.6%
4 Guinea-Bissau 2004 9.4%
5 Senegal 2007 9.4%
Table 6: Estimates of remittances/GDP ratios, top 5 African countries7.
The data on remittances come from a number of sources. None of them is really
completely satisfactory. We shall discuss the diﬀerent sources of data, and note the
limitations of each. One diﬃculty with the oﬃcial statistics is that so much of the
7 From IMF Balance of Payments data as reported in Barajas et. al. (2010).
41ﬂows of remittances take place through informal channels - friends and family cash
transfers, or the hawala system. In our empirical exercise, we shall specify the
possible biases that could result from the use of diﬀerent datasets on remittances.
1. Balance of Payments Data - Broad Deﬁnition: The oﬃcial statistics for
remittances are obtained from the Balance of Payments data collected by the IMF.
The broad category used is that listed under "Workers Remittances, Compensation of
Employees, and Migrant Transfers," made up of three constituent parts: (i) Workers’
Remittances, deﬁned as current private transfers from migrant workers resident in
the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration status, to
recipients in their country of origin; (ii) Compensation of Employees, deﬁned as
wages, salaries, and other beneﬁts paid to individuals who work in a country other
than where they legally reside, for example, seasonal workers;a n d( i i i )M i g r a n t s ’
Transfers, deﬁned as the net worth of migrants who are expected to remain in the host
country for more than one year that is transferred from one country to another at
the time of migration. Migrants’ transfers are reported as “capital transfers” in the
capital account of the balance of payments accounts.
The data are published by the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI), which
relies on the IMF’s Balance of Payments Yearbook (item codes 2391, 2310, and 2431
respectively). Data are available from 1970 and onwards. This source is very often
used in the literature on remittances. As has been pointed out by Chami et. al.
(2008), this is on the one hand too broad of a deﬁnition, as it adds "wages, salaries,
42and other beneﬁts paid to individuals who work in a country other than where they
legally reside, for example, seasonal workers". On the other hand and as mentioned
earlier, it is also widely believed that a huge part of the remittance ﬂows of individuals
from host to home countries does not pass through the oﬃcial channels at all so would
not be picked up in the BOP data. Freund and Spatafora (2008), based on market
survey reports, indicated that the informal transfers may lie in the of 50% to 250%
of recorded ﬂows, depending on the country. Authors may use the more expansive
BOP deﬁnition to compensate for the fact that informal transfers are excluded but
are important. This deﬁnition is used by Kapur (2004), who explains further the
pluses and minuses of its use.
2. Balance of Payments Data - Narrow Deﬁnition: This uses only the
entry "Workers’ Remittances Receipts" in the Balance of Payments. In particular, it
applies the correction to (1) advocated by Chami et. al. (2008). The problem with
using this narrower deﬁnition is that there are fewer observations as, presumably,
for many countries the aggregate of the three portions of (1) are listed, without
a disaggregation into component parts. For example, countries like South Africa,
Kenya and Ivory Coast appear not to have entries for the narrower deﬁnition.
3. The United Nations IFAD8 Data:
8From their web page, (http://www.ifad.org): "The International Fund for Agricultural Devel-
opment (IFAD), a specialized agency of the United Nations, was established as an international
ﬁnancial institution in 1977 as one of the major outcomes of the 1974 World Food Conference. The
Conference was organized in response to the food crises of the early 1970s that primarily aﬀected the
43In an attempt to capture informal ﬂows of remittances, the IFAD (International
Fund for Agricultural Development) has developed and reported data based on sources
like population censuses in destination countries, household surveys, Central Banks
and other oﬃcial government sources, money transfer companies, international or-
ganizations and academic institutions. Sample estimates are obtained from which
extrapolations are made.
4. National Central Banks:
Individual countries, especially the Central Banks, also gather local data on re-
mittances. For (2003) in Ghana, the Bank of Ghana estimates that the remittances
equaled US $1,017.2 (Addison 2004) which is an order of magnitude higher than the
US $65million estimate of the World Bank in the same year. Even this amount may
be an underestimate. Mazzucato et al. (2004) suggest that unregistered remittances
ﬂowing into Ghana is around 65% of the total, meaning that the true remittances
are around 3 times the value of the Bank of Ghana numbers. Based on this, the
(2003) remittances of Ghana equal $3billion. Informal quotes by the then Ghanaian
President John Kuﬀour put the 2006 number at US $4bn, while that of the Minister
of Tourism and Diasporan Aﬀairs put the number at US$ 4.3bn in 2007. (see Voices
of the South on Globalization, No. 8, 2007). Note that this would make remittances
a sizeable percentage of GDP.
Sahelian countries of Africa. The conference resolved that "an International Fund for Agricultural
Development should be established immediately to ﬁnance agricultural development projects primarily
for food production in the developing countries".
44Irving, Mohapatra, and Ratha (2010) reports on the ﬁndings of a 2008-09 World
Bank survey of 114 central banks worldwide (33 in Africa). Approximately 43 percent
of respondents in remittance-receiving countries collect information on remittances
transferred through informal channels. Of these respondents, 42 percent base these
estimates on information and data gathered in household and/or overseas migrant
surveys. The report notes that there can be very large discrepancies between what
central banks report to the IMF and what was reported to the World Bank in the
survey: e.g. for Ghana, remittances reported to the IMF totaled $105 million in 2007,
while remittances reported in the survey were $1.8 billion (pp. 6-9).
5. Other Studies:
Bollard et al (2009) describe and analyze a new dataset on remittances. The
database is a compilation of micro-level immigration data from 14 surveys in 11
OECD destination countries. According to the authors, these countries were the
destination for 79% of all global migrants to OECD countries in 2000. The surveys
cover 33,000 immigrations, including 12,000 African migrants to 9 OECD countries
( B o l l a r de ta l ,N o v0 9 ,p .9 ;B o l l a r de ta l ,A p r1 0 ,p .4 ) .
Table 7 provides the data on remittances for African countries from various
sources, with WDI-broad and narrow representing the broad and narrow deﬁnitions
of remittances mentioned in (1) and (2) above, and in current US $ millions, 20069.
9World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) downloaded June 2010.
45Table 7: Remittances per year, in current US $ millions, 2006.
46As argued above, the numbers from the Balance of Payments data probably do not
capture what we need when we speak by remittances. In our baseline "Simplest
Model" scenario, we use the higher UN IFAD numbers in computing remittances.
The UN IFAD numbers are much more in accordance with Central Bank ﬁgures we
have obtained from local African nations. This results in a per migrant remittance
value of US $5,260 for Ghana (total of US$851m from 161800 migrants). In our
baseline ﬁgures above we also indicated the internal rates of return and net present
values at a per migrant remittance of US $3600 (or $300 per month). Our robustness
section discusses even lower values of the remittances.
The numbers that we use will be average remittances over all classes, and we
believe that this captures more fully the remittances of the tertiary educated. We
now proceed to the question of remittances from diﬀerent educational classes.
10.2 Decomposition of Remittances from Diﬀerent Educa-
tional Classes
In our computations we will be using average remittances of nationals abroad when
determining returns to tertiary education. One potential problem that needs to be
addressed is the possibility that diﬀerent educational groups send diﬀerent levels of
remittances. In particular, if it turns out that the tertiary educated remit much less
than the average, then our use of the average remittances would bias upwards the
47positive eﬀects of the brain drain of the skilled.
Although one would a priori think that the higher skilled, being better educated,
are more likely to remit more, some (e.g., Faini (2007)) that the skilled are more likely
to bring their families with them to their host country, and therefore remit less. The
basic ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by Niimi, Ozden and Schiﬀ (2008) who suggest that a 1 %
increase in the proportion of university educated migrants will lead to a 2.8% decline
in total remittances.
Bollard et. al. (2009) on the other hand, show the opposite. The authors focus
on the relationship between remittances and educational attainment of migrants (all
source countries). They look at both the likelihood of remitting and the level of
remittances. They ﬁnd that migrants with a university degree are less likely to remit
than migrants without a degree (27% versus 32%). However, the average level of
remittances is higher for migrants with a university degree. The authors ﬁnd that
remittance behavior is primarily accounted for by income eﬀects — i.e. more-educated
m i g r a n t se a r nm o r em o n e ya b r o a da n da r et h u sa b l et os e n dm o r eh o m e .
Next, we note that there are many studies which ﬁnd no impact of education on
remittances per migrant (e.g., Naufal (2007) for Nicaragua and Rodriguez and Horton
(1994) for the Philippines).
4810.3 When Do Remitters Remit?
One could also ask: When Do Remitters Remit? We model in our baseline scenario
remittances to be independent of time of return. Bollard et. al. (2010) show that
future returnees remit more. Gundel and Peters (2008) ﬁnd that individuals that
send remittances home are more likely to re-migrate.
10.4 Data on Wages Abroad used for the Individual Problem
We proceed by providing a few snapshots on the data, each producing slightly diﬀerent
estimates of the average wage rate of tertiary educated Ghanaians moving abroad.
We will use these snapshots in explaining how we arrive at a ﬁgure we will use in
our computations. We have, we believe, used very conservative numbers (i.e., low
foreign wage rates).
1. From the Docquier et. al. datasets, we know that approximately 44% of the
Ghanaian migrants to the US have tertiary education. The US Census data
states that 31% of their sample of people born in Ghana and resident in the US
has tertiary education. This is not a perfect measure of incomes, but it should
come close. It is imperfect because, of course, many of those who migrated to
the US with less than tertiary education could later become tertiary educated
i nt h eU S . S i n c ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nw a g ed a t a ,w eu s et h eU SC e n s u sd a t a
which also asks individuals for wages and we compute the average income of the
49top 31% of Ghanaians in the US. This gives us a mean household US income
of between $74,000 and $104,000 (the high and lows of the US 2000 Census
income buckets), or $89,000 with the mid-point value. Assuming a two-income
household gives us an income level of $45,000 per person.
2. The average individual income of all Ghanaians in the US among full time
year-round workers is, according to the US 2000 Census US $32,262 for men
and $26,235 for women. We know from the Docquier et. al. datasets that
a majority of the migrants are men. A simple average of the two would give
$29,242.50.
3. Although a large percentage of migrants from Ghana move to the US, a signiﬁ-
cant percentage also go to other Western European countries. We however use
the same US ﬁgure for them. We do not currently have precise data for the
UK, but we doubt that this will signiﬁcantly throw oﬀ our IRR computations.
4. We of course need to exclude taxes from income statements. Or do we? Taxes
after all are, for the most part, returned as beneﬁts to the individual in terms
of services, unemployment beneﬁts, etc. Further we did not take out taxes
from the Ghana data. At the income levels we are using in the US, the average
federal tax rate was 16.6% in the year 2000. Even if we assume Ghanaian
taxes are zero (they are not), addition of the taxes did not measurably the very
large IRR values.
50In our ﬁrst pass at the Individual Problem, we will use the after tax average annual
US income values. That is, the wage ﬁgure in (2) above less US federal income taxes
of 16.6%. We obtain an annual after tax wage of $24,388. As argued above we
b e l i e v et h i st ob ea nu n d e r - e s t i m a t eo ft h ew a g e s .
11 Robustness
We will begin by discussing the eﬀect of changes in various parameters used in the
model. We hope that this will enable us to test the basic assumptions of our model.
Our baseline parameters are those used in the implementation of the village econ-
omy presented earlier. The values of our parameters involve estimates from diﬀerent
sources. In this robustness section we will vary some of the parameters across a range
obtained from the literature or that seem reasonable as ranges. We will look at the
impact of changes in these parameters on two types of results we could be interested
in:
1. The ﬁrst is on how the return to education as a whole is aﬀected - this is the
ex ante deﬁnition of education taking into account those who stay and those
who leave. This is measured by the NPV of the educated (NPVE)-a g a i n ,t h i s
includes both the locally resident and the drainers.
2. The other question is the eﬀect on the comparison between the return of the
locally resident educated versus the drainers. This is measured by NPVLRE
51and NPVD, and their internal rates of return.
As described in the introduction, the second question gets most of the attention
in the media and in the press, but it is ﬁr s tw h i c hs h o u l db et h em o s tr e l e v a n tf o r
policy makers in many developing African nations. As we argue here, the returns
to education are large, even allowing for the Brain Drain. The policy implication
should be an increase in education. In this robustness section however, we will
discuss the implications on both questions as we change our baseline parameters.
We proceed in the next section by discussing the eﬀect on our two questions in
(1) and (2) above, of changes in the costs of education, C, of the wage proﬁle of the
tertiary educated, of the level of remittances and of the drainage probabilities. We
will measure the eﬀect of these changes by looking at the changes in the internal
rates of return (IRR) and the Net Present Values at baseline rates of interest of
r=5% (which we denote by NPV5) for the relevant quantities required in answering
questions (1) and (2) above.
11.1 Cost of Education
Suppose we have under-estimated the average cost of tertiary education. Suppose
that the costs are higher than what we have from oﬃcial statistics. Suppose further,
that following Feldstein (1995), that the true cost of each $1 of spending is actually
52say $2 because of the distortionary eﬀects of the taxation required to raise that $1.
How will this aﬀect our conclusions on the Brain Drain?
In our baseline "Village Economy," all tertiary educated have the same cost C
of education, whether they stay in the local economy or eventually leave. Changes
in C therefore aﬀect the locally educated exactly the same as the drainers. In
situations where the NPV of drainers is higher than that of the locally resident, as
was in our baseline model, if the drainers become "unproﬁtable" in an NPV sense
(i.e., NPV less than zero) because of increases in the cost C, then so too would the
local non-drainers, since the latter have lower NPVs. Indeed, the locals will become
unproﬁtable before the drainers in this case - i.e., at a lower level of cost.
So, how much of a diﬀerence in the cost of education do we need to overturn our
results? Well, keep the wage proﬁle at our baseline, as obtained from the livings
survey data, and maintain the remittance level at our (lower) baseline of $3600 for
Ghana. Deﬁne the "Cost Multiplier" to be the corrective multiplicative factor to
costs - so that a cost multiplier equal to 1 is the baseline cost data as reported by
oﬃcial statistics and, for example, a cost multiplier equal to 2 denotes doubling the
costs of tertiary education - as perhaps recommended by Feldstein (1994).
The Table 8 below shows the decrease in the internal rate of return (IRR) and
in the value of the Net Present Value NPV at the baseline interest rate of r=5%,
NPV5, caused by the increase in costs from our baseline values to twice the baseline
value. The internal rates of return still drop, but remain positive and large for
53education as a whole (from 23% to 14%) and particularly for the drainers (32% to
20%). Similarly the NPV5 computations all remain positive.
One could ask how costs have to be to begin to overturn the positive NPV5
numbers. It turns out that we would need costs 5.6 times the baseline cost values
for the returns to begin to be negative. The negative returns begin with the lowest
values - the NPV5 of the locally resident educated. At that level the other NPV’s
still remain positive, and it takes a cost factor of 7.4 for the NPV5 of the Educated
(which includes both resident and drainers) to become zero.
Table 8: Eﬀect of Changes in Costs C.
Again, we note that the changes in the robustness exercise here are changes in
costs only, keeping all other relevant parameters at their baseline "Village Economy"
levels mentioned in the earlier section.
5411.2 Are there Quality Issues and Capacity Constraints on
Production of Tertiary Educated?
We presented in Tables 3 and 4 the cost data across Africa as these values are critical
for our computations and the entire NPV exercise. We will not pursue here in any
detail the very interesting question of the changing production function of tertiary
education in Africa as capacity rises. One of the policy recommendations of this
paper will be an increase in output in tertiary education in Africa. If there are ca-
pacity constraints and the costs ﬁgures rise signiﬁcantly as enrollments rise, contrary
to the impression given by Tables 3 and 4 above with everything else remaining the
same, then our policy recommendations may no longer be valid. We have a number
of responses to this concern. (i) It is our own view that economies of scale will work
as a check on rapid rises in the costs of tertiary education. We have seen declines
over time in the per person costs of tertiary education since independence of many
African countries, and although it is unlikely to fall much further in the future, it is
also unlikely, in our opinion, to rise that steeply. (ii) The capacity constraints of real
signiﬁcance are related to the shortage of professors for the universities - other costs
like housing and infrastructure one would expect to have major economies of scale.
The shortage of professors is probably related to the existence of better opportunities
in the local economy for both the professors and the graduates themselves. However,
if wages of graduates are rising, then the entire Net Present Value exercise needs to
be redone as this could increase the baseline returns to tertiary education without the
55brain drain (what we called NPVvillage e a r l i e r ) . T h a ti s ,t h ef a c t o r sw h i c hc a u s ea n
increase in costs (shortage of professors) could also increase the wage of locals. The
negative eﬀect of increased costs of professors is mitigated by the increased wages of
graduates in our NPV computations.
In summary, if the production of tertiary education is supply constrained and costs
go up, there is the potential for our policy recommendations to be made invalid. At
this time we do not believe that the changes in costs will change that rapidly, due
to economies of scale, and further as it changes there are other parts of the calculus
which will also move around which will result in small net eﬀects.
Quality Issues: There is a second and related issue concerning the possibly declin-
ing quality of the tertiary educated graduates in local African universities as there
is a massive push in enrollments. Here it is important to distinguish two parts
of this question - that related to past graduates and our computations above, and
those related to future graduates and our policy recommendations. As regards the
computations in the village economy earlier and those using current data, we have
already incorporated quality issues into the computations. Presumably, the wage
rates locally and remittances (which should be related to wages abroad) are all a
function of the quality of the tertiary educated. They have therefore already been
accounted for.
The bigger issue is with the policy prescriptions for the future. If tertiary en-
rollments are expanded and quality falls, how would this aﬀe c to u rb a s i ca r g u m e n t ?
56Well, ﬁrst there is the question of the returns to tertiary education itself, even without
taking into account the brain drain; i.e., the term NPVvillage. The reduced quality
will presumably reduce the local wages and perhaps lead to increased unemployment
of the tertiary educated. How do these reduced wages compare to the new reduced
costs of education? It is the comparison of these two which will determine the net
eﬀect.
How about the eﬀect of reduced quality of graduates on the incremental returns
to brain drain, ∆NPVabroad? Well, the main channel will be via remittances. Since
remittances are a small proportion of total wages abroad, it is possible that these
remittances will stay relatively robust even as there are reductions in wages abroad
due to reduced quality of of those graduates.
Our position on the quality issues is related to that of costs and supply constraints
mentioned earlier. Since the NPV’s of education are generally positive and since there
are returns to scale in the provision of tertiary education as evidenced by past cost
data, we believe that there are opportunities for increasing the quantity of education
without major impacts on the quality.
11.3 Wages of non-Draining Locals
Suppose we have under-estimated the level of wages of the locally resident educated.
Suppose this is either because of poor data, or non-representative samples. Alter-
natively, this could be because we are incorrectly measuring the value of the tertiary
57educated by their wages. How would an upward revision in the wages of the locally
resident aﬀect our results?
It should be repeated here, however, that given the high unemployment of the
tertiary educated, it is not obvious that the existing wages are an under-estimate in
our village economy model. However, we perform this robustness check anyway.
An increase in the imputed wage rate of the tertiary educated with no change in
that of the secondary educated will of course increase the NPV’s and internal rates
of return to educated of the locally resident. Further, to the extent that some of
the drainers return, the higher local tertiary wages will also increase the NPV’s and
IRR of the drainers. In particular, a revision upwards in the wage sequence of the
tertiary educated will increase all NPV’s and IRR’s.
How about the comparison between the locals and the drainers? Well, an increase
i nt h el e v e lo ft h ew a g es e q u e n c ew i l lo b v i o u s l yh a v eab i g g e re ﬀect on the locally
resident than the drainers. So, how much of a diﬀerence in the wages of locals do
we need to overturn our result that the expected NPV’s of the Drainers exceed those
of the locally resident. Again, note that we keep all other parameter equal to our
baseline levels: costs are those from the UNESCO datasets and we maintain the
remittance level at our baseline of $3600 for Ghana. Let the wage multiplier denote
the corrective multiplicative factor to the sequence of local wages - so that a wage
multiplier equal to 1 is the baseline wage sequence and, for example, a wage multiplier
equal to 2 denotes doubling the local wages at each and every date. Table 9 below
58shows the increase in the internal rate of return (IRR) and in the value of the Net
Present Value at the baseline interest rate of r=5% (NPV5) caused by the increase
in local wages. The internal rates of return rise from 14% to 24% for locally resident
tertiary educated and from 32% to 33% Drainers, and from 23% to 29% for the
tertiary educated as a whole. The NPV’s at 5% interest rates rise from $17,229 to
$54,971 for the locally resident tertiary educated, from $31,197 to $47,596 for the
Drainers and from $24,213 to $51,270 for the tertiary educated as a whole.
Table 9: Eﬀect of Changes in Local Wage Sequence.
We also note that the wage multiplier of 1.65 is needed for the expected NPV at
r=0.05 of locals to exceed that of the drainers (where again we should stress that
we believe the comparison of NPV5 of locals to that of drainers is actually not the
appropriate question to be asking.)
It should be mentioned that part of the reason for the exercise in this section is
that the data we have indicates what some many may consider to be low domestic
wage rates. Part of the issue is that we have correctly included wages of unemployed
as 0. It should be stressed that the main conclusions do not change much when we
omit the unemployed. The average wages will rise, but deﬁnitely not as much as
59the two-fold rise modeled in this robustness section.
11.4 The Eﬀect of Errors in Measurement of Remittances
The earlier section explained the eﬀect of changes in local wages. The eﬀect of
changes in remittances is almost the exact opposite. An increase in remittances
aﬀects the relative importance of Drainers in comparison to locally resident in only
those periods an individual is away, just like the eﬀe c to fw a g e s . A$ 1i n c r e a s ei n
the remittances has the same positive relative eﬀect (i.e., on NPV of drainers minus
NPV of locally resident) as a $1 decrease in the local wage rate.
We now ask what happens if suppose that our estimates of the remittances are
too high relative to our baseline (of $3600). We should mention here we actually
b e l i e v et h a to u rr e m i t t a n c el e v e l sa r et o ol o w ,a n dd on o ti n c l u d ea l lt h ei n f o r m a l
remittances and investments of people who are abroad. Nonetheless, we provide the
robustness checks here.
In particular, we look at remittance multipliers: a remittance multiplier of 1 is
the baseline level, and a multiplier of 1/2, say, means that we use remittances equal
to one half of our baseline level.
A decrease in the imputed remittances of the tertiary educated drainers with
no change other parameters will of course decrease the NPV’s and internal rates
of return to the drainers, and will not aﬀect the locally resident. In particular, a
revision downwards in the remittances of the drainers will decrease all NPV’s and
60IRR’s except those of the locally resident.
Table 10 below shows the decrease in the internal rate of return (IRR) and in the
value of the Net Present Value at the baseline interest rate of r=5%, NPV5, caused
by the decrease in remittances from our baseline to half its value. The internal rates
of return all remain positive. The biggest drop, as would be expected is among the
drainers who never return - the NPV5 ﬁgure goes down from 33,026 to $6,256.
Table 10: Eﬀect of Changes in the assumed level of remittances.
We also note that the remittance multiplier of 0.6 is needed for the expected
NPV5 of locals to exceed that of the drainers. (Again, we stress that the comparison
between locals and drainers is not the right question; it is the NPV of the educated
as a whole taking into account the drainers - in the table it remains positive even
with a halving of our baseline remittance numbers.)
11.5 The Drainage Probabilities
The Net Present Value of the educated, NPVE, is a weighted average of the NPV’s
of the locally resident educated, NPVLRE, and the drainers, NPVD. The larger is
61the probability of drainage, d, the more the weights move the NPVE toward NPVD
and away from NPVLRE.
So, suppose we have miscalculated the drainage probability and that instead it is
a larger number. Since for most of our computations NPVD exceeds NPVLRE, the
increase in the drainage probability d will increase the NPV of education. It will
actually strengthen the main conclusions of this paper. It is indeed possible that our
drainage probabilities, being the average drainage rates (nationals abroad divided by
total nationals for the tertiary educated) may underestimate the marginal drainage
probabilities (those in the most recent years) if the drainage probabilities have been
rising over time.
11.6 Timing of Return
We have adopted a very stylized model of the timing of return of those who drain
and come back. We have assumed all who drain leave immediately after school and
those who return do so in 7 years10. The more general case involves a complex model
of the tertiary educated leaving at all diﬀerent dates and returning at diﬀerent dates
with a complicated model of return probabilities and random durations of stay.
10One may be concerned that a return date of 7 years means that the returnees are not important.
This is not correct. First, a return date of 7 years means that at a 5% interest rate, since 1/(1.05)7 =
0.71, we see that after 7 years approximately 71% of the value is retained with 29% discounted
relative to the present value. Further, we are comparing income streams so both returnees and
non-returnees incomes are both discounted, and at the same rate.
62O u rf e e l i n ga tt h i st i m eb a s e do nt h ev a r i o u ss u r v e y sw eh a v es e e ni st h a tw eh a v e
probably under-estimated the duration of stay abroad. Given the relative values of
the remittance term and the local wage rates, this would imply that in a more general
model we should have larger returns to tertiary education more generally and to those
who drain more speciﬁcally. A more general model, given the other parameters in
the model will most probably strengthen our general conclusions.
11.7 Post- Year 2000-2005 data issues
We have worked with a lot of data from around the year 2000-2005. This has been
constrained by the data sources we have - the data on stocks of migrants usually
are obtained from census ﬁgures, many which were last taken around the year 2000.
There are a number of post-2000 developments that should be discussed. In Ghana
there has been a tremendous increase in enrollments at the tertiary level over the
past 5 to 10 years. As the enrollment levels have increased, so too presumably
has been the per person costs of education. Many have remarked that this has been
associated with reduced quality of education. We discussed issues of costs and quality
in our robustness section above. The big open question is what is the extent of the
brain drain currently as the total stock of tertiary educated has increased so rapidly.
Rather than speculate, we await the census ﬁgures which should be in within the
next couple of years in Ghana and in many other countries.
6312 Items Omitted from Discussion
12.1 Skills of the Returnees
D u et oal a c ko fd a t a ,w eh a v em o d e l e dt h er e t u r n e e sa sh a v i n gn oe x t r ae d u c a t i o n
after their time spent abroad. We know however that many come back with superior
skills, which could be extra formal education or skills in more advanced economies
working in sectors for which there would be few opportunities for advancement in
their home countries. There has been quite of attention put on the importance of
returnees to India in the Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) industries
there. If these beneﬁt so ft h er e t u r n e e sa r ea d d e d ,t h e yw i l lo fc o u r s ei n c r e a s et h e
already high returns to those who drain out of the country. In much earlier work (see
Easterly and Nyarko (2009)), we have commented on the skills of the returnees. We
reserve for subsequent work the study of the improved skills of those who return. We
merely remark here that if these skills were added into the computations our results
would be stronger, and we believe considerably so. In that sense, the fact that we
have obtained strong returns to education and the brain drain without including these
factors may be a reﬂection of the power of our results.
12.2 Internal African Migration
The focus of much of our work has been on the Brain Drain outside of Africa. There
has been quite a bit of Brain circulation within Africa. Adepoju (2002) and (2006)
64have observed that highly-skilled African professionals have increasingly found South
Africa and Botswana to be "attractive alternatives" to Europe, the U.S. and the Gulf
States. At this time we do not have data indicating large transfers of the tertiary
educated from one sub-Saharan African country to the next. We leave the question
of within-Africa brain drain or circulation to future work.
12.3 Labor Hoarding?
As the economy of Ghana and many other African countries improve, we are beginning
to get anecdotal evidence of an increase in the return of the tertiary educated. This
of course begs an obvious question. Could it be that it was a great idea to educate
people and have them sent abroad when the economy was doing poorly, so that they
could form a reserve pool of skilled labor ready to come back to the home country
when the economy improved? Was there an invisible hand leading the central planner
to educate people and to "hoard" them in foreign countries so that when the local
economy could absorb them they are available to return? Our data can not directly
test this hypothesis of course, but the model we present could easily be tweaked at
get a handle at this. Again, we leave an in-depth discussion of this for future work.
12.4 Incentives
In other work (see Easterly, W. and Y. Nyarko (2009)) we have discussed the very
important literature on the question of the role of incentives to invest in education
65in the presence of the brain drain. The basic idea is that in the presence of the
brain drain and the opportunity to receive very high wages in the future with some
probability, individuals make bigger investments in their education (either in terms
of money spent or eﬀort in studying and attending university). This incentive eﬀect
could increase the supply of the tertiary educated so much that it more than compen-
sates for those who leave. In particular, the ﬁnal number of tertiary educated left in
the home or source country after the brain drain exceeds the number who would be
in the country if the incentive eﬀect of the brain drain was not there (say by banning
the drain by law or by making it extremely diﬃcult for people to leave).
13 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the brain drain in Ghana. We have performed some
rates of return to education computations using various datasets. Our main con-
clusions are that when using wages and remittances in standard cost-beneﬁtr e t u r n s
to education computations, we have found that there have been high rates of return
to tertiary education in general, taking into account the brain drain. Both from a
social or "village" point of view as well as from the individual point of view, the rates
of return are large.
Our results on the individual returns to education resolve a paradox in the returns
to tertiary education literature, which often ﬁnds low or sluggish returns. This is
paradoxical given the clamoring for tertiary education by leaders and the general
66publics in many sub-Saharan African nations. It is also paradoxical as one may
expect a high rate of return to tertiary education in countries which have such low
stocks of tertiary educated and where development is a priority.
In our robustness checks we have stress tested the model, and the main conclusions
seem to withstand these tests. Various variables we have omitted from our analyses
may strengthen the conclusions we have.
There are several issues we wish to highlight in our concluding remarks. First, we
point out that in most of the conversations on the brain drain in Africa, it is almost
universally considered something which is bad and to be avoided. The arguments in
the media and in policy circles often use a cost-beneﬁt argument. It is often stated
that "the government has wasted money" if people trained at the tertiary level then
drain out. Our numbers show that these statements must be made carefully, and
indeed that the opposite may be true. There are also arguments of the form "if
only the highly skilled would stay" the local economies would do much better. Our
results at least cast a little doubt on such assertions.
More importantly though, our results indicate that there is room for creative
thinking around the question of tertiary education provision. We have found high
internal rates of return to tertiary education. This suggests that creative thinking
around the provision of higher education could possibly be both self-ﬁnancing (or even
return a proﬁt) and lead the education of large numbers of people. At currently
levels of local incomes, however, this may involve some leaving the home country, at
67least for a while. In particular, rather than thinking of the brain drain as a curse
upon the economies of sub-Saharan African countries it could instead be a part of
the instrument to use for expanding the number of tertiary educated who are in the
local economies. If it is known that one out of every two tertiary educated people
leave the country, then the logical implication is that there is the need to train twice
as many to get the desired number locally. Our numbers show that this may indeed
be feasible ﬁnancially for the sponsoring entity (the government or NGO?). Our
numbers also suggest that the individuals would also be able and willing to pay for
loans incurred in this process. Our computations suggest interesting possibilities
with ﬁnancing schemes for tertiary education which (a) explicitly take into account
the possibility that some will drain out of the country and (b) which asks those who
are out of the country, and presumably earning more money, to pay higher amounts
to reimburse the government for their education. The analysis also suggests that the
p a y m e n t sb yt h o s ew h ol e a v ec o u l di np r i n c i p l ef o r mt h eb u l ko ft h ei n c o m ew h i c h
in later years will ﬁnance the massive expansion of tertiary education in the local
economies.
For emphasis, we should note all the beneﬁciaries of schemes as described above.
First, since this is potentially self-ﬁnancing, the local economies will beneﬁtf r o m
expanded numbers of educated. Second, by introducing a new ﬁnancing system for
higher education, those who are initially credit constrained may be able to attain
an education which otherwise would have been denied them. Finally, it should be
68remarked that those who end up being part of the brain drain should be counted in
the welfare computations. In the discussions and the rhetoric on the brain drain it is
often presumed that once Ghanaians leave their country they cease being Ghanaians
and so their welfare no longer matters. Should the goal of development not be the
development of Ghanaians as opposed to those who happen to reside in Ghana? If a
large number of people are educated who otherwise would not be, and a large fraction
of those get improved incomes and livelihoods abroad who otherwise would not or
would be unemployed in Ghana, is that not a positive to be included in evaluating
policy?
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ee v a l u a t e dt h ec o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts of the tertiary education
system including the calculus all Ghanaians, those abroad and those in the home
country. Our data show that continued investments in tertiary education may yield
signiﬁcantly large net present values and internal rates of return and further that
higher education ﬁnancing schemes could therefore be ultimately self-ﬁnancing.
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